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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JOE S. YALDEZ, 
vs. 
Appellant, } 
(Case No. 
I 10843 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~IENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
The Appellant, Joe S. Valdez, was convicted of 
the crime of assault with a deadly weapon and with 
being an habitual criminal in the District Court of 
"T eber County, State of Utah. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
A complaint was filed against Joe S. Valdez on 
the 19th day of .November, 1966, alleging that he did 
commit an assault with a deadly weapon by use of 11 
knife 011 Jose Don Valerio. In addition, a complaint 
was filed charging that the appellant was an habitual 
criminal. Trial was held in the District Court of \V eber 
County on the 29th day of December, 1966. After a 
jury trial the jury returned the verdict of guilty on the 
charge of assault ·with a deadly weapon. The status of 
being an habitual criminal was subsequently tried to 
the court and the appellant was convicted of being an 
habitual criminal and sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison in accordance with Section 76-1-18, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that in view of the preju· 
dicial error committed at the time of his trial on the 
charge of assault with a deadly weapon that his con· 
viction on that charge be reversed as well as his status 
as being an habitual criminal and a new trial granted. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 7 :30 a.m. on the morning of 
November 19, 1966, l\fiss Shirley 'Vilkerson drove the 
defendant, Joe Valdez, to his dental appointment in 
downtown Ogden, Utah. Upon arriving early, the two 
2 
decided to go into Gus's Tavern located in the middle 
of the block between \Vall and Lincoln on the north 
<de of ~.ith Street. They entered and went all the way 
t() the rear of the bar since all the chairs in front were 
( 1ccu p [ed ( T. 68-86) . Since there were no chairs in 
b;1d~ the defendant stood up to the bar while .Miss \Vil-
kerso11 stood close by. Next to Valdez near the end 
()j' tlie bar stood a large Indian ( T. 86). 
Oll the same morning the victim, Jose Valerio, was 
also iu G-us's Tavern drinking beer. Valerio later tes-
titied that he went to Gus's that morning because he 
had been doing a lot of drinking the night before and 
felt bad (T. 30). According to Valerio, Valdez walked 
t1p to where he, Valerio, was standing at the bar, grab-
bed him saying, "I am going to kill you," and stabbed 
him in the stomach with a knife ('f. 31). \Vhen the 
stabbing occurred Valerio stated that there was no one 
close to him except Valdez ( T. 33) . However, at trial 
Rose Hewitt testified that she was sitting not more than 
four or five feet away (T. 42). :Miss Hewitt testified 
that from this small distance she didn't hear the de-
fendant say "I am going to kill you." She saw the 
<lef endant hit him or punch him in the stomach and then 
she left ( T. 42) . She did not see a knife. 
A much different account of the fight was given 
b~,. both the defendant and Shirley \Vilkerson. Accord-
ing to them Y alerio came up to Valdez and asked for 
a beer. Valdez obliged. A few minutes later Valdez 
complained to Valerio about keeping his hands and 
3 
arms off of him. Valerio kept on bothering him (T. 63). 
Then Valdez pushed Valerio back against a pay tele-
phone. , ... alerio came right back and Valdez then hit 
him on the jaw knocking him down (T. 64, 86). As 
Valerio fell he bumped against the Indian, who either 
grabbed him or pushed hi~ (T. 65). Miss "\Vilkerson 
later testified at trial as follows ( T. 86, 87) : 
" ... Joe told him to leave him alone, but he still 
kept bothering him. So he hit him and 
knocked him down. 
"Q. Did you see him at the time that Joe hit 
him? 
"A. Yes, he fell and then this Indian jumped 
in, I don't know what he did to him. I seen 
him get up and go out the back door. 
"Q. Now, you say you saw Joe hit Mr. Valerio! 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. 'V ould you tell us how Joe hit him and 
where he hit him and what happened? 
"A. 'V ell, he swung around and hit him with his 
right. 
"Q. "\Vhere did he hit him? 
"A. On the jaw. 
"Q. This knocked Mr. Valerio down, is that cor· 
rect? 
"A. Yes, and then the Indian jumped him. 
"Q. Did the Indian hit him? 
"A. I don't know if he did or not. I know the 
guy got up and left." 
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Although no one in the crowded bar saw the stab-
bing except the victim himself it was later discovered 
that \T alerio had been knifed sometime during the 
~cuffle. About five minutes after the incident in question 
\' alerio got up and left the crowded bar without saying 
a word to anyone. He went home to his sister's, who 
took him to the hospital. 
At about 8 :45 a.m. on the same morning an Officer 
Thomas, \vho was assigned to the patrol division, re-
cei,,ed a call from an unknown source who stated that 
there had been a stabbing in Gus's Tavern. Officer 
Thomas arrived almost five minutes after another 
policeman, Officer Flink, had finished searching the 
bar. Flink said he could find no evidence of any stabbing 
(T. 45). Thomas then went inside to further check 
on possible clues as to what may have occurred. While 
inside he searched and questioned Valdez but discovered 
nothing. Thomas stated that he saw a large Indian 
standing close to Valdez. Thomas also testified that 
the bar was full and practically every stool was filled. 
He stated that everyone interviewed about the alleged 
stabbing denied seeing any fight, including the bar maid 
( T. 47, 50). The Officer also checked the floor for blood 
but found no traces ( T. 46) . 
On November 21, 1966, a signed statement from 
Y alerio identifying Valdez as the assailant was ob-
tained. The fallowing day, on November 22, a complaint 
was signed and a warrant issued for the arrest of Joe 
Y aldez charging him for assault with a deadly weapon. 
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The next day, November 23, shortly after 8 a.m., ~Ir. 
Richards, attorney for Valdez, called Officer Brook~ 
and asked if a warrant for Valdez had been issued. 
Cpon finding out there was one, Mr. Richards made 
arrangements for Valdez to turn himself in ( T. 50, 
56). 
The trial began on December 29, 1966, before the 
Honorable John F. 'Vahlquist, and eight jurors. The 
defendant was convicted for assault with a deadly 
weapon and for being an habitual criminal. On January 
5. 1967, he was sentenced to be confined in the Utah 
State Prison for not less than 15 years (R. 14). It is 
from that verdict and sentence that the defendant 
prosecutes this appeal. 
During the course of the trial numerous errors were 
committed, three of which were prejudicial and are re· 
lied on by appellant for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ· 
t:DICIAL ERROR IN NOT LI~IITING THE 
.JrRY'S CONSIDERATION OF OTHER 
CRil\IINAL INYOLYE~lENT ADMITTED TO 
SHO"T l\IOTIVE ONLY, SINCE 'VITHOUT 
seen A CCRATIVE INSTRUCTION THE 
JCRY COlJLD INFER THAT THE EYI· 
6 
UEXCE COULD BE COXSIDERED TO SHO\\' 
Tll E (~E~ERAL CRll\IINAL PROPEXSITY 
OF TUE APPELLANT. 
At trial the prosecution m order to establish a 
motive referred several times to a meeting between 
t lie defendant and Valerio two years prior to the stab-
nmg. Both Valdez and Valerio had been drinking 
together when Valdez was arrested for drunk driving. 
I 11 order to link this incident to the stabbing the state 
que..,tioned Valerio on direct (T. 22): 
Q. Did the officer arrest him? 
A. Yes, he arrested him. 
(-J_. Did you have any argument with him at all? 
A. No. 
(~. Did you later have an argument? 
A. 'Ve ... , he called me on the phone about two 
or three times and wanted me to take the blame,you 
know. 
Q. The blame for what? 
A. For driving the car. 
(-J_. 'Yhy did he want you to take the blame? 
A. He said, "I don't want to go to the pen and if 
you want to take the blame," you see. 
The state also questioned Valerio's wife concerning 
the possible motive and she testified (T. 35): 
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Q. Do you know of any arguments that he ar
11
: 
your husband have had? 
A. No, not that I can recall, no. I-le had a ca~ 
from him and another word from him, because I ar~­
swered the phone about a year ago. He wanted to talk 
to .Jose and him had been together that year befort 
\Vhen they eaught him upon that drunk driving. j 
was right by my husband when they were talking . 
. My husband had already told me about this, so I didn·'· 
want to be nosey, I was listening to them when the! 
were talking on the phone, and he said he wanted Jose 
to take the blame for the drunk driving, because ht 
said, "I can't afford to go back in, because of any more 
trouble." 
\Yhen the state cross-examined Valdez the follow· 
ing questions concerning the same incident were askeci 
(T. 75, 76): 
Q. This is a man that testified against you in the 
Court of the drunk driving case. 
Q. This is your friend? 
Q. You got real mad at him, didn't you? 
Q. Because you "..anted him to take the blame fnr 
it? 
Q. Do you remember calling him on the phone. 
,-ou heard the testimony of his wife here, calling him 
and asking him to take the blame for you? 
In summation before the jury the prosecutor re· 
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c11foreed and emphasized the importance of the moti,·c 
testimony ( T. 103) : 
·· ... The motive, if there was a motive here 
' appeared to he the fact that he felt that this for-
mer friend of his should have taken the blame 
so he wouldn't get his parole revoked, because 
of the drunk driving provision, he would be back 
to prison. He would ha,·e to serve more time. 
This is something he was concerned about. It 
made him unhappy. 
* * * 
This man has a record of having been in the 
prison. The court has told you that doesn't dis-
eredit his testimony, but certainly you can con-
sider it in believing him or not. 
Isn't it interesting that everyone else is at 
fa ult except Joe? The other man causes all of 
these troubles. He is sitting up in the back seat 
of the car but he forgets to remember that here 
he is in a place violating his parole, right at the 
time, even if he hadn't done this he would have 
been violating his parole. 
Now he wants you to believe that he isn't the 
man that caused· this trouble. No evidentally 
( sie) there must have been some ill feeling about 
this man when he grabbed him here and said 
"I'm going to kill you." This isn't something 
that men do just every day." 
In an effort to keep the trial judge from uncon-
sciously com·eying misleading information the defense 
oh.iected to the following instruction: 
"Proof of a motive for an alleged crime is per-
missible and often is valuable, but never is es-
9 
sential. If after consideration and comparison 
of all the evidence, you feel an abiding conric-
tion to a moral certainty that the defendant com-
mitted the crime of which he is accused, the 
motive for its commission becomes unimport-
ant. Evidence of motive is sometimes of as-
sistance in removing doubt and completing 
proof which otherwise might be unsatisfactory. 
)loti,-e may be shown by positive evidence ~r 
by facts surrounding the act if they support a 
reasonable inference. 'Vhen thus proved, motin 
becomes a circumstance, but nothing more than 
a circumstance, to be considered by you. The 
absence of motive is equally a circumstance to be 
reckoned with, but on the side of innocence, tend-
ing to support the presumption of innocence. 
and to be given such weight as you deem proper.'' 
The above instruction was not uttered in a vacuum. 
It must be read in the context of the whole trial. The 
testimony as to motive was found in the same portiom 
of the record in which references to defendant's credi· 
bility and criminal record appeared. The fundamental 
error in the instruction is the absence of language liniif· 
ing the permissible use of the drunk driving evidencr 
to show motive and nothing else. 'Vithout such curatiw 
language it is reasonable to conclude that the jury 
could and did also use the evidence to show the 
appellant's propensity to commit the crime and, there-
fore, as a basis for an inference that he committed the 
crime for which he was on trial. The jury might also 
have improperly but reasonably believed such evidenct 
would be used to show that the defendant was not to 
be believed even though under oath. It is undeniable 
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tlia t the instrudion without any restrictive language 
11 hen coupled with the repititious references to the inci-
dent. at trial caused undue emphasis in the minds of 
the jurors. 
The requirement of limiting the purpose of evi-
dence of other crimes was articulated in State v. JV el-
lurd. ;J Ctah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 ( 1955). In that case 
tl1c defendant was prosecuted for issuing a fictitious 
clicck. The state in an effort to show defendant's intent 
t () defraud in cashing the check introduced evidence of 
J11other eheck which defendant cashed but which the 
l1ank had refused to pay. In receiving the evidence the 
trial court properly instructed the jury that it could 
011ly be used by them for the purpose of showing intent. 
011 appeal the Supreme Court in affirming the convic-
tion used the following language which is apropos 
here: 
" ... It is settled in this court that the state 
may not prove that the defendant committed 
other offenses merely to show his propensity for 
the commission of crime, because such evidence 
is apt to be given undue weight. However, evi-
dence of other crimes is admissible if it tends to 
prove that he had the necessary intention for the 
crime charged. For evidence admissible for one 
purpose is not inadmissible because it fails to 
meet the requirements for another purpose, but 
the }ury should be instructed not to use it for 
the inadmissible purpose. This the court did in 
this case and contrary to defendant's argument 
such instruction was clear and understandable 
by the jury." 
11 
It is importa11t to point out the distinction betwee
11 
eYidence which is admitted because relevant to the Ola.iii 
issues in dispute and evidence admitted for a limitei; 
purpose. In the present case it "\Vas admitted for tht 
latter, to show motive. It had very little relevancy t,. 
show intent and no relevancy towards supplying a \in~ 
in the d1ain of events which constituted or indicated 
the commission of the crime charged. Nor is it relevant 
to show that this particular defendant is not tellin11 
' the truth.< 1) It is inescapable that the only real rele-
vancy although tenuous, goes to show a possible factor 
inducing the commission of the crime, nothing else. 
The policy against allowing such weak probative eri· 
dence was clearly stated in State v. Dickson, infra. 
where the court stated: 
" ... the very purpose of excluding such eri· 
deuce is to prevent the prosecution from smear· 
ing an accused by showing a bad reputation and 
relying on that for conviction rather than being 
required to produce adequate proof of the crimt 
in question. It is the sound and salutary policy 
of the law to indulge everyone, including con· 
victed felons, with the presumption of innocence. 
and to require the state to obtain and present 
sufficient credible evidence to convince the jury 
of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged 
bevond a reasonable doubt. If this were not so. 
se;ious and perhaps insuperable obstacles to 
reformation and rehabilitation would exist for 
a man who had once acquired a bad reputation.'' 
( 1 l Drunk driving is not an offense that may be used to impeac~ 
the credibility of a witness. State v. Fournier, 193 A. 2c 
924 (Vt. 1963). 
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111 Stall' v. Dicf..:8un, U Utah ~d 8, 361 P. :ld 41~ 
\ 1 \Hi l i. The defendant was charged for robbery of a 
-'TOl'lTY store. Ile appealed from a conviction allegi1w 
h • 0 
, \1 u errors. The first error related to questioning about 
pre,·ious felony Clmvictions. The Supreme Court said 
t~1at tlic defendant could properly be questioned about 
pn·\·ious felo11y co11victions for the purpose of impeach-
i11g his nedibility as a witness. However, in that case 
the prosecutor pressed beyond such purpose, when after 
tlw defendant had admitted to two robbery com·ictions, 
:1c fttrther asked whether both of them happened to he 
rood markets. The prosecutor based his right to go into 
t lw details of those felonies upon the theory that he 
":ts tryiBg to show a "modus operandi," to show that 
the ace med was following some plan or scheme of which 
'it her crimes were a part, or where the crime was com-
mitted in some particular way, so as to lead one to think 
tlie same crimes were committed by the same person . 
..:-\.!though the case was not resolved on this issue the 
court stated that it did not approve the admission 
of nidence of the modus operandi since no logical 
inference could be drawn that the person who com-
mitted the one committed the other. The second error 
upon which the defendant appealed concerned improper 
([itestioning of the defendant as to being involved in 
an otf ense where his brother was involved in a felony. 
That questioning concerned an incident in Texas, sub-
..,equent to the alleged robbery in Salt Lake City. The 
th~frnclant stated that he had been charged but not 
~:·ied for robbery m Texas. This Court in reversing 
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held that such cross examination of defendant was not 
justified fur impeachment purposes or on the modu~ 
operandi theory. Although that case is factually dis-
tinguishable from our case the same policy exists here. 
In our case as in Dickson, no requirement of similarity 
peculiar to the two crimes has been satisfied. The phone 
calls to Yalerio do not compel any logical inferenct 
that \' aldez stabbed Yalerio. \Vithout any limiting 
instruction prohibiting the jury from using the driving 
incident as evidence of general criminality it is possible 
that an intelligent lay person listening to it at the close 
of trial could be misled into using such for resolving 
a doubt on the criminal involvement rather than re-
quiring the state to produce adequate proof of tht 
crime. Certainly the error here can't be considered 
harmless in light of the language used in State v. Dick-
son, supra: 
"Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree 
of assurance that there would not have been a 
different result in the absence of the error in 
cross examining the defendant about the incident 
in Texas, it must be regarded as prejudicial and 
the case remanded for a new trial." 
Erroneous instructions were held to be reversible 
error in Montgomery v. United States, 203 F. 2d 887 
(5th Cir. 1953). In that case the defendant was con-
victed for willfully and knowingly attempting to defeat 
and evade income taxes. The Circuit Court reversed 
and held that although the district judge could exercise 
broad discretion in admitting evidence to show defend· 
14 
ant\ motive in not reporting his illegal gains or to 
t'- ta bl ish the possible source of the funds used for the 
l'\peuditures, he should have cautioned the jury that 
.,ul'11 e\·idence was admitted only for the light it might 
throw on those specific purposes and no inference of 
guilt could be drawn merely from the commission of 
11ther offenses different in character. 
The same policy was the basis for a reversal in 
l'l'oj!ic 'l'. Bentley, 131 Cal. App. 2d 687, 281 P. 2d I 
1 J!l,),) i. In that case the defendant was convicted of 
lewd co11d11ct in violation of the state statute. On ap-
peal the District Court of Appeals for California re-
\ersed primarily for failure of the trial court to give 
<'a11tionary instructions as to the limited purposes on the 
inquiry of cross examination. 
Recently the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia on another but closely related 
<1uestion, used language which is apropos here. In 
.17. .. ·kard v. United States, 352 F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 
I \)()5) , the court held even cautionary instructions might 
not protect the interests of the defendant. In that case 
the defendant \Vas convicted of simple assault and as-
sault with intent to kill. The prosecuting attorney 
cross-examined defendant's character witness concern-
ing defendant's prior arrests. Both witnesses were asked 
whether they had heard of defendant's two prior arrests 
for assault with a dangerous weapon or her conviction 
for disorderly conduct. Since both arrests grew out of 
domestic quarrels, upon complaint of defendant's hus-
15 
band and since the conviction also arose from a domestit 
quarrel, the court was not at all impressed with its rele-
vancy. Judge \Vashington in reversing the convictior! 
stated: 
"The use of such evidence must be closely su-
pervised by the trial judge, not only to assa1 
the prosecuting attorney's good faith but t;J 
consider whether the probative value of the in-
formation which might be elicited outweighs the 
prejudice to the defendant. 
" ... Cautionary instructions, copiously pro-
,·ided by the trial judge in this case, do not gire 
the accused adequate protection. They cannot 
prevent the jury from considering prior actioru 
in deciding whether appellant has committed 
the crime charged. The courts need not rest on 
the assumption that juries can compartmentalize 
their minds and hear things for one purpose and 
not for another. The Supreme Court took the 
lead in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. 
Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964), by going 
behind the historic assumptions of the law of 
evidence and considering the psychological real-
ity of the jury's functioning, in that case as it 
related to its consideration of the voluntariness 
of confessions." 
In light of the above principles, the trial judge in 
the instant case was clearly in error for not giving the 
jury an instruction allowing them to compartmentalize 
the evidence. Although it may be extremely difficult 
to frame a limiting instruction so as to give full pro· 
tection to the rights of the accused this particular in· 
struction falls far short of giving the accused the benefits 
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to ,rliieh he is entitled. In the absence of any similarity 
111 1 lil' driYiug incident and the crime charged here, such 
,,, ide11l'e has no probative value and its only effect 
,rnuld be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and 
imply that because he was involved in driving trouble 
lit· is a person likely to commit a crime or testify falsely . 
. \ limiting instruction certainly was required and the 
i'ailme to give such an instruction was prejudicial 
error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CO.Ml\IITTED PREJ-
t 'IHCIAL ERROR IN DENYING DEFEXD-
.\X'l''S REQUEST THAT THE JURY llE lX-
~TRUCTED ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY 
SIXCE THERE \VAS EVIDENCE IN THE 
HECORD TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INSTRL"C-
TION. 
After the Jury had retired the court asked the 
defense attorney if he would like to make any matters 
of record. l\Ir. Richards raised the following objection 
to the instructions when he stated (T. 127): 
''The only thing, your IIonor, for the sake of 
the record, I would like to let the record show 
that I requested the additional instruction to the 
jury as a result of l\Ir. Anderson's argument 
relative to the assult necessarily connected with 
a deadly weapon and not from ·~n assault stand-
point separately. I think they might be confused 
upon that point." 
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Although the request was made, no instruction \la\ 
given. The court submitted to the jury only two alter-
natiYe verdicts. The jury could find the defendan'. 
guilty or not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. 
It is common knowledge that jury instruction~ 
must be responsive to the issues presented. The issue~ 
in criminal cases are determined by the evidence. Tht 
fact that evidence may not impress the judge does not 
authoriz.e him to ref use an instruction raised by tbe 
e,·idence. However incredible the testimony of the de-
fendant may be, he is entitled to an instruction based 
upon the hypothesis that it is entirely true. 
\\' e don't deny that if the only evidence presented 
m this case was that of the state that an instruction 
on the lesser offense of assault and battery would ht 
improper since instructions must be grounded upon 
the evidence. But this case is different since both sides 
presented different versions of the stabbing. The error 
in the present case is that the court in its limited in· 
structions imposed upon the jury only the prosecution's 
theory of the case. Under that instruction Valdez was 
either guilty or not guilty of assault with a deadly 
weapon. The jury should have been given the other 
alternative verdict. If the jury believed Valdez's ver· 
sion, it would have been required to bring in a verdict 
of simple assault and battery and not assault with a 
deadly weapon. 
The record contains substantial evidence to support 
the instruction on assault and battery. Both on direct 
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:tnd 011 cross-examination, \'aldez stated that he hit 
\ :tlerio 011 the jaw but did uot stab him. Shirley \\'il-
h.n-;u11 011 dired examination stated that Yaldez ''swung 
:trotiwl and hit him with his right." She testified that 
-..11e was standing dose by but saw 110 kuife nor had 
a11y reason to belie,·e that Yal<lez knifed \'alerio (T. 
t\7 1. Hose Hewitt, who was standing not more tha11 
ti1t' fret from the iuei<le11t, stated that she saw \'aldez 
l11l or punch Yalerio but saw no knife ( T. 42). Con-
trary to \' all'rio's version, she did not hear \'aldcz 
~ay "l am going to kill you" nor did she see \' aidez 
,:.:Tali Yalerio by the coat or shirt as the complai11ant 
l1ad JllTYiously testified (T. 42). There was evidence 
i11 the reeord which pointed to the Indian at the ernl 
"r the har as the possible perpetrator of the stabbing. 
\.a ldcz testified on direct that when he hit Yalerio the 
i ndian, who was standing at the end of the bar " ... 
~.trahbed him, or either grabbed him or pushed him 
\\'lieu he fell back against him ... " Shirley "'ilkerson 
testified that when Yalerio fell the "Indian jumped 
him (T. 87). "'Vhen asked whether the Indian hit 
Yalerio she stated: "I don't know if he did or not. I 
know the guy got up and left." 
The ahove version of the incident did not go un-
eontradicted but that is not the measuring rod as to 
whether a lesser included offense has been placed in 
issue. The Pnited States Supreme Court in Stet•enson 
"· l'11itcd States, 162 e.S. 313, (1896), stated at p. 
:n4: 
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" ... It is difficult to think of a case of killing Ir, 
shootiug, where both men were armed, and bur: 
in readmess to shoot, and where both did shoo; 
in which the question would uot arise, for th· 
jury to answer, whether the killing was murder 
or manslaughter, or a pure act of self-defenst 
The evidence might appear to the court to b: 
simply <H"erwhelming to show that the killin~ 
was in fact murder, and not manslaughter, o~· 
au act performed in self-defense and yet, .ir 
long as there was some evidence relevant to tht 
issue of manslaughter, and credibility and forct 
of sut:h e\·idence must be for the jury and cannu 
be matter of law for the decision of the court. 
The same reason is equally applicable to the fact-
of the present t:ase. Only in the event that Valdez wa~ 
either guilty of assault v.·ith a deadly weapon or inn11· 
eent of that offense could the instruction given by th~ 
trial court be deemed correct. Such an instructio1 
would be correct only if the prosecution's evidence 
tended to prove that assault with a deadly weapon had 
been committed, and that the defendant had denied 
any connection with the alleged offense. But in tht 
instant case, the fact of simple assault and battery wai 
conceded and the stabbing denied. In such a situation 
the court cannot ignore the jury's right to believe that 
portion of defendant's testimony which negates the 
commission of assault with a deadly weapon, and con· 
cedes assault and battery. The issue of simple assault 
and battery was squarely posed, and it was prejudicial 
error not to instruct thereon. 
The eases which have considered the court's duty 
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111 11;sl!'lll'I as tu lesser offenses fall basically into three 
;.! !'\ill ps: ( 1 1 The iirst group i11voh·es the extreme "·here 
11~ i'L 1s n 1dcm'l' 'd1id1, if aceeptecl by the trier of i'aL t. 
1•.1111id ahsolYe defendant from guilt of the greater 
, ,ic:1-,c. although it would also support a finding that 
,:1 1, :1s guilty of a crime of lesser degree. 111 this situa-
l ;1111 -,ome eo11rts hold that an instruction 011 the lessn 
1.il l·11-,c rnust be gin·11 eYen though not requested. and 
1i(1 lllaitcr how unlikely it may appear that any yerdiet 
.illwr llta!l one of guilty of the higher offense would 
: 11· rd11rned. People 1'. ~llorrison, 228 Cal. App. :!d 
711:-. :rn Cal. Hptr. 87 4 ( HW4); Smith v. State, 8:3 Oki. 
l d :!11!1. 1 'i.> P. :!cl :348 ( 1940) ; State 1·. Littlcjoh n. 
:).i11 ~l(I. 10.32, 204 S. \V. 2d 750 ( l!H7); State 1•. Fouts, 
I 1i:I l~an. li8(i, 221 P. 2d 841 ( 1950); State 1'. Kicks, 
~ii :\' .l'. 1.)(), 84 S.E. 2d 545 ( 1954) ; People v. Car-
1'1111. :w Cal. 2d 7u8, 228 P. 2d 281 ( 1951); People 
.. .Jeter, HO Cal. 2d 071, 388 P. 2d 355 (19o4); (2) 
I 11 the second group of cases the extreme opposite is 
fourtd "here the eYidence, even though construed most 
!'arnrably to defendant would not support a finding 
of guilt of the lesser offense or degree, although the 
,.,·idrnee would, if construed by the trier of fact in fayor 
111' the prosecution, support a finding of guilt of the 
l11gher offense. This situation is generally found in 
l'a-;es wht'r<: the defendant denied any complicity in 
!lie crime charged, and thus lays no foundation for 
a11~· HTcliet intermediate between "not guilty" and 
·~·11ilt>·". This situation is also found where the clefrncl-
a11! req11ests 110 instruction and there is no eYidence 
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t. 
in the record to raise the issue as to the lesser charg 
State v. Jlitchell, supra; State v. Pou/,son, supra; Stat
1 
'!J. Dodge, supra. (3) The third situation involves thi) 
case and is intermediate between the two just discussed. 
Here the evidence is sufficient to support a finding 
of guilty of the greater offense based upon the state~ 
version, and it is also sufficient to support a finding of 
guilty of the lesser offense based on appellant's version. 
since appellant admitted the assault and battery but 
denied the stabbing. Thus, since there was both a re-
quest for an instruction as to the lesser offense and 
evidence in the record to support the request, it wa~ 
error for the trial court not to give an instruction 01. 
the lesser offense. 
State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P. 2d ll30. 
( 1937) , is almost identical to the present case and 
should be deemed controlling here. In that case the 
defendant, a sheep rancher, was charged and convicted 
of assault with a deadly weapon for shooting a former 
employee in the leg. Defendant claimed he shot the 
complainant in the leg to keep him from stealing sheep. 
The state's evidence was that the defendant shot the 
complainant in Hie leg during an argument over a debt 
defendant owed complainant. Defendant requested the 
instruction as to the lesser offense, but the trial court 
denied the request and took the position that since the 
defendant admitted shooting the complainant inten· 
tionally to prevent him from stealing he could not ask 
the jury to disbelieve his own testimony by allowing 
him an instruction inconsistent with his own theory of 
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tlw L"ase but must rely on the defense that he was justi-
licd in shooting him. The court on appeal reversed 
:ind held the jury could pass upon complainant's story 
a:- well as defendant's and believe either, neither, or 
parts of both. The court at p. 579 lac. cit. addressed 
itsdf tu the question whether the trial court should 
haw instruded the jury as to lesser or included of-
fmses since such instruction was requested. The court 
stated it was error for the trial court to submit the 
('at1sc to the jury on only two possible verdicts, guilty 
(1r not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. The 
nnirt in criticizing the theory on which the trial court 
r<'fused to instruct, stated as follows: 
..... This theory, however, clashes with two fun-
damental rules, in trial of criminal cases: It has 
the effect of the court weighing the evidence 
and, in effect, limiting the jury to a consideration 
of only part of the evidence (the defendant's) ; 
and it, in effect, bases upon the defendant the 
burden of proving his innocence or justification. 
'i\T e recognize the rule that where defendant 
admits the facts substantially as contended by 
the State, and justifies his act, he has the burden 
of showing the facts to establish his justification. 
But in the instant case, defendant did not admit 
the State's account of what had happened at the 
."I hooting; but denied it in toto, and told an en-
tirely different story of what had occurred and 
hml.' it happened. He put directly in issue all 
the evidence of the State and the dut.lJ of weigh-
iny one story against the other, belonged to the 
}zff/J and not the court. And if the jury believed 
Cordovo's stor.11 of how the shooting occurred, 
thc.11 might well find a verdict on a lesser charge. 
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" * * * the court1S, we think, without excepti(J
11 
lw_n' held that, •v.:hcrc th.e accused is charyed 
'lA,'tih a yreatcr off ensc, he zs nevertheless entitled 
to an in.-,truction that the jury may convict hin, 
uf a lc1S1Scr uff cnse if included within the greater 
that is, he may he found guilty of simple assuit. 
or assault and battery, unless the evidence is ui 
such character as will necessarily require a find. 
ing that the greater offense was committed b, 
him.* * * It is, however, always a delicate matte.r 
for a trial court to withhold from the jury tht 
right to find the accused guilty of a lesser ur 
included offense and determine the question of 
the statet of the evidence as a matter of law. That 
should be done only in very clear cases." 
As mentioned, the present case is unlike State:. 
,:l/itchell, 3 etah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618 (19jj 1. 
In that case the defendant was convicted of sec· 
ond degree murder. The evidence at trial showed 
that the defendant had possession of a .25 calibre 
pistol and was seen to he holding the pistol at the 
head of the hotel staircase just after the murder. 
'Yhen the defendant was apprehended two days later 
human blood was found on his hands and five matching 
.25 calibre cartridges were found in his suitcase. De· 
fendant appealed to this court alleging that it was error 
for the court not to instruct as to the lesser included 
offenses. The court refused to reverse the conviction 
primarily for two reasons. First, it was not persuaded 
that there was any evidence from which reasonable 
persons could conclude the victim had died from a 
simple battery, or otherwise than with malice afore· 
thought or as a result of a murderous intent. Second. 
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awl most important the court felt that since the de-
fru<lant failed to request the instruction, "it would 
~t·cm pa I pa bly unreasonable" to allow him to sit by 
"1th positive assurance of another trial if his client was 
l'' 111,ided. It is important to note that the court limited 
its holding as follows: 
"\Ve confine our holding to the particular 
situation where instructions are not requested 
and not given." 
The present case is quite different since defendant 
did request the instruction and there certainly is evi-
dence in the record to reduce the offense to a lesser 
degree. Appellant put the lesser offense in issue when 
he denied the stabbing and presented his own version 
(lf what happened. 
State v. Poulson, 14 Utah 2d 213, 381 P. 2d 93 
1196:3), is also different than the present case. In that 
ease the defendant was tried upon a charge of murder 
committed in perpetuation of rape or burglary. In 
Poulson, the defendant did not deny murdering the 
girl. His sold defense was that of not guilty by reason 
of insanity. On appeal defendant alleged error con-
tmding the jury was not properly instructed on the 
lessor included offenses. Defendant contended that his 
mental condition was such that he could not entertain 
the specific intent to commit the crime charged. The 
Supreme Court refused to reverse and held that de-
fendant's position could not be maintained since he 
did not request any instructions on lesser included 
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offenses, and smce it was apparent from the recuri. 
that he chose to submit the case to the jury on an "a: 
or nothing basis." Our case is easily distinguishablt 
Ile re the defendant not only requested the instructi011 
but he also denied committing the crime and presentei. 
his own version of what happened. That is entire]1 
different than the Poul.son case. 
The present case is also unlike State v. Dody1 
Utah 2d ____ , ____ P. 2d ( 1967), where the defenda11: 
was convicted of perjury in the first degree. Defendai:: 
appealed on the ground that the trial judge gaYe 111 
instruction as to the lesser included offense of secon1: 
degree perjury. The court refused to reverse for tht 
reason that the defendant did not request any sucl 
instruction. The court went even further and statei: 
that if a request had been made an instruction wouli 
have been improper since the evidence was such tha 
defendant was guilty of first degree perjury, or he 
was not guilty of any crime. The court cited and relied 
on the following excerpt from State v. Ferguson, 7i 
lJtah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929), where this court statt<l 
at 266: 
"It is a well settled rule that instruction as tc, 
lower grades of the offense charged should bf 
given when warranted by th~ ~vidence. It. Ii 
equally well settled that in a cr1mmal .P~osecut10r 
error cannot be predicated on the om1ss10n of tht 
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the 
l h . 'd Ii offenses charged w 1ere t ere is no ev1 ence ·1 
reduce the offense to a lesser grade." State T 
Angle, et al., 61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531. 
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In ruuny v. United States, 309 F. 2d 662 (D.C. 
Cir. l!Hi:!), the court had before it an assignment that 
tile trial court erred in failing to give a requested charge 
011 t lie lesser included offense of simple assault where 
the defendant was charged with assault with intent to 
rnmmit robbery. In reversing, the court used the fol-
](lwmg language which is also applicable to the present 
(':!St': 
'· ... However, implausible, unreliable or 
incredible only the jury has the right to make the 
evaluation of 'Vest's testimony. The evidence 
of a simple assault cannot be regarded as strong 
or convincing and perhaps the source could well 
be regarded as of dubious reliability, but the 
(1uestion of its weight and credibility was for the 
jury. On 'Vest's testimony it was possible, even 
if not necessarily plausible, that 'Vest was 
searching the pockets for weapons not money 
or other valuables. The evidence was sufficient 
to warrant a jury to infer that 'Vest's intent 
was to rob and this intent could be to appellant 
as an aider and abettor; but it was also sufficient 
to allow for another permissible verdict, i.e., 
that appellant was simply assaulting Collins 
while "rest searched for weapons. Even when 
instructed on the lesser included offense of simple 
assult it would be permissible for the jury to 
totallv disbelieve 'Vest or to believe that part 
whicl; tended to exculpate appellant from an 
intent to rob. The jury might reasonably con-
clude that 'Vest, by giving his testimony, was 
trying to do a favor for his friend Young and 
therefore, might reject his explanation as to 
the object of the search of Collins. But without 
the critical instruction they would not be afford-
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ed the choice which was exclusively a jury choi~t 
The ruliug denying the lesser included ott'e111, 
inslrudiou necessarily involved an apprai~al 11 ; 
that evidence and \Vest's credibility by the Di~­
trid .Judge but the trier cam1ot withdraw that 
appraisal from the jury." Kinard v. Cniteti 
States, ti8 App. D.C. 250, 9ti F. 2d 522 ( 1938 1. 
See also Stevenson v. United States, 162 l'.S 
~H3, 323, 16 S. Ct. 839, ~o L. Ed 980 (1890,1. 
lu Kinard v. United States, supra, and Steven11u 11 
v. LT nitcd States, supra, cited by the court in Y u111111 
v. C nited Slat cs, supra, it is interesting to note that 
both eases were reversed for failure to instruct on tht 
lesser included offense of manslaughter in a trial for 
murder. A reading of those cases will emphasize tht 
necessity of submitting the issue for the determinatioi, 
of the triers of fact. See also United States v. Jlou1-,. 
Hi CSC~IA 375, 36 C~IR 531 (1966). 
In Brough man v. United States, 361 Fed. :2d il 
(D.C. Cir. 196{)), the defendant was convicted of rob-
bery in the lower court. He appealed seeking reversa'. 
of his robbery conviction on the ground that the trial 
judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on tht 
lesser included offeme of simple assault. In that cast 
the (;.overnment's e\·idence consisted of the complaini11~ 
witness testifying as to being robbed and struck in tht 
face by appellant while appellant's co-defendant wa, 
holding him. The co-defendant denied the charge and 
testified that the appellant "·as merely trying to sep:i-
rate the plaintiff from a screaming woman and tha! 
appellant never struck the plaintiff, but merely pulled 
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at him. The iudictmeut alleged a taking by force and 
11olern:e. The court held that an instruction on the 
ks~cr included offense of simple assault should be re-
q u1red si11cc there was evidence of the lesser crime. The 
goYernment argued that the co-defendant's testimony 
~liowcd a justifiable assault and that plaintiff's testi-
mo11y showed a robbery. Therefore, the government 
L'!>11tended the jury would have to believe all or nothing 
oi' either the co-defendant's or the plaintiff's testimony. 
1'11e eourt disagreed and reversed, relying primarily on 
l'uun.<J '1'. Cnitcd States, supra. The court made the fol-
111\1 i11g statemeut which is certainly apropos in the 
present case: 
"The fact that Blake's testimony raised an 
issue whether appellant was guilty of any crime 
at all is not inconsistent with appellant's claim 
that this same testimony raised an issue whether 
a lesser included offense had been committed. 
Here the jury could have believed Blake's tes-
timony that he and appellant did not rob \Veed-
on while at the same time finding, in light of 
the injuries sustained by \Veedon and the fact 
that appellant was found with bloody clothes 
and skinned knuckles, that they had assaulted 
him. \Yhether the assault was justified was a 
question for the jury." 
The same analysis should apply here since the jury 
· could have believed" Yaldez's testimony that he did 
not stab Yalerio while at the same time finding, in light 
of the story told by Shirley \Vilkerson, that Valdez 
as~aulted Yalerio without any knife. 
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Appellant is not unmindful of the decisions whici, 
hold that in certain cases where the evidence is all 011' 
sided and shows a willful, malignant, and maliciou, 
killing, au instruction 011 the lesser included ott'en,, 
may not be justified. The same may be true where tlit 
defe11da11l fails to request an instruction and d1oo~t· 
the "all or none" approach. The case law, howerer 
is almost unanimous in recognizing the necessity fo1 
instructing the jury as to an included crime of les~ti 
degree when there is evidence from which the jur.1 
could find that such lesser crime was committed. Tii, 
presence of such evidence is the determinative facti11 
111 looking at the re<.'ord there is ample evidence in tl111 
<.'ase. \ 'aldez was not silent as to what occurred in Gu~, 
'Ln·ern. Xo knife was found. Appellant's testimon:, 
alone or even Shirley \Vilkerson's alone is enough\, 
require an instruction on simple assault and battery 
Appellant did not admit the state's account of wha; 
happened, but denied it in the most important asper! 
and gave his own account of what occurred. It wa' 
reversible error not to let the jury pass upon that 
n,rsion as well as the state's and believe either, neither 
or parts of both. 
POINT III 
AFTER EYIDEXCE OF THE DEFEXD· 
AXT'S PRIOR COXYICTIONS HAD BEE~ 
..:\D)IlTTED FOR TIIE PURPOSE OF DI· 
PE..:\CH)IEXT. IT "r AS PREJUDICIAL 
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EHHOH FOH THE TRIAL COCRT TO GIYE 
I:\STHl 'CTIOX XC)IBER 10 \YITIIOCT AX 
I\ STHl 'CTI OX LI:\IITING THE PCllPOSE 
l-'()H \\'IIICH THE E\TIDENCE HAD BEEX 
.\U-'ll'l'TED. 
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's 
re<lue:-,t for a more limiting instruction and sending to 
l l1l' J lll'Y instruction number 10 which reads as follows: 
"The fact that a witness had been convicted 
uf a felony if such a fact, may be considered by 
you in judging the credibility of that witness. 
The fact of such a conviction does not neces-
sarily destroy or impair the witness' credibility 
and it does not raise a presumption that the wit-
ness has testified falsely. It is simply one of the 
circumstances that you are to take into con-
sideration in weighing the testimony of such a 
witness." 
Because of the prejudicial and repetitious ques-
tioning of Y aldez by the prosecutor, Mr. Roland An-
der-.;on, )lr. Richards took exceptions to the above 
instruction contending it would place undue emphasis 
1H1 the fact that the defendant had been convicted of 
prior crimes ( R. 98). Th exception did not cause the 
rnurt to change its instructions to the jury. 
The prejudicial effect of letting the jury know 
(\f these prior convictions is acknowledged by many. 
l ts admissibility is based primarily on the belief the 
.i11ry ha-; the ability to segregate the evidence according 
to its permissible uses. However, when the court admits 
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e\·ide11ee of other corn·ictions for credibility purpo,t, 
it should also instruct the jury to limit the considerat 11 ,: 
of the evidence to the issue of credibility. The tri: 
court failed to limit the instruction in this case. l: 
."ilritc 1'. lf'i11yct, t> etah 2d 243, 310 P. 2d 738 ( IH.37 
.J uclge \\" ade obsen-ed the possibility of prejudiet .. 
admitting evidenee not relevant to the issue of guil· 
Ik stated as follows: 
·· ... Except where otherwise provided by HuJe, 
of E,·idence all relevant evidence is ad1;1issihlt 
Relevant e\·idence means evidence having a tti1-
deney in reason to prove or disprove any ma-
terial facts in issue. However, evidence that·' 
person committed a crime on one occasion is ir,-
admissible to prm·e his disposition, bad character. 
or propensity to commit crime as the basis f,.r 
an inferenee that he committed the crime frr 
whieh he is on trial, but such evidence whe: 
re}e,·ant is admissible to prove some materi:i; 
facts including the absence of mistake or acciden' 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan. 
knowledge or identity. The reason for excludin~ 
such evidence is that the danger of prejudice out· 
weighs the probative value of such evidence." 
It is not denied that the defendant's attorney cl!i 
opening arguments first brought out the fact that tht 
defendant had been c01wicted on prior occasions. I'. 
doing so. :\Ir. Richards knew he was not opening an: 
door that wouldn "t he opened anyway since the de· 
fe11dant Yaldez would e\·entually have to take the stanc 
to defend himself. But just because l\1r. Yalclez t0t1 ~ 
the staml to protect himself. that doesn't mean he should 
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lw denied those limitations on eYidence referred to by 
.I us tire \\' ade. The defendant had no real choice in the 
lll:tttl'r. Ile had to testify to defend himself. It should 
lit pointed out, however, that the prosecutor, before 
the def e11dan t took the stand, illicited eYidence per-
t;1i11 i11µ; to the defendant's prior convictions. )Ir. An-
dt"l'SlJll obtained information from Valerio on direct 
t'\.:tmi11a ti on concerning the possibility that Valdez 
11111 dd be baek in the "pen" if Valerio wouldn't take the 
idamc for the drunk driYing charge ( R. 22). Valerio's 
11 ifr when questioned on direct examination also men-
t i111wd that Valdez called Valerio and stated that she 
Iii ard the defendant say, "I can't afford to go back 
111 lieeause of any more trouble." 
In an effort to impeach the defendant, the prose-
l'll tor asked Valdez on cross-examination the following 
r<'petitious and prejudicial questions concerning prior 
rnmes including his parole violations: 
(~. 'Yhy did you go to the tavern (R. 73) ! 
(~. Do you know that is a violation of your parole? 
Q. You didn't care about that, did you? 
Q. You knew you could go back to prison for that, 
didn't you 1 
(~. That didn't stop you from going there? 
(~. You knew it was a violation didn't you? 
Q. You also knew if you didn't get caught you 
11011ld1i't go hack to the penitentiary, didn't you? 
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Q. Now, you state that you have been m pri~(, 1 
is that right? 
Q. l\lore than once? 
Q. 'Vhat were you in prison for? 
Q. 'Vasn't it, in fact, you were charged with r(i' 
bery (R. 74)? 
Q. In fact, it was assault and robbery, too, wa,;
1 
it? 
Q. I am talking about this time of release. w:!· 
it in l\lay? 'Vhat was the charge for which you recein-, 
sentence? 
Q. The original offense was assault and robhm 
isn't that the truth? 
Q. You had been m prison before that too! 
Q. You had been in prison on another offense' 
Q. You had been in prison on other offenses bt· 
fore this? 
Q. Now, of course, you know that assaulting some· 
body is a violation of your parole too, isn't it (R. 80 
Q. And also carrying a knife would be a violatim 
too, wouldn't it? 
Q. And, also going into the tavern is a violatior. 
too, isn't it? 
Q. And drinking is a violation too, isn't it? 
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(~. And. keeping company with people that are 
11 , 11 .i ust right is also a violation, too, isn't it! 
(~. There is a lot of things that is a violation, isn't 
:hat righU 
(~. Y m1 pay attention to those that you want to 
pay attention to, isn't that right? 
(~. You pay attention to those that are violations 
tl1at you want to, and those that you don't want to, you 
dC1ti't pay any attention to? 
(~. Let me make it clear to you. 
(~. You don't mind going to the tavern enough 
:n{iugh you know that is a violation, you don't mind that, 
d11 ~·ou ( R. 81) ? 
(~. You have been in the tavern many times during 
the time you have been on parole, haven't you, Joe? 
(~. You have been in fights too, while you have 
ht·c11 on parole, too haven't you, Joe? 
The prosecutor again mentioned the defendant's prior 
eonvictions in his closing argument to the jury. He 
~t:tted (R.104): 
"Joe isn't what you would say is an inexperi-
enced man. Joe has had experience with the law 
before. Joe is a smart man, by the way. His 
testimonv from the witness stand indicates that 
this mar{ is a thinker. If he were to-here is a 
man that obviously has already violated his parole 
regulations. He is going to places he should not, 
he is drinking, he is possibly associating with 
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people he shouldn't he associating with under 
1 
parok arrangement." 
It is11 't denied that when the defendant does ta, 
the sta11d the prosel'ution may as a rule impeach Ii: 
by i11trodll<:i11g his past reeord. IIowever, the pr11v 
eutor's refen·nl'es to the defendant's violation of par. 
hy going i11 a har or having a drink have no reasonai,, 
relationship to veral'ity as against the likelihood 
pre.)udil'ing the jury. The whole line of questio11i1.. 
allowed under the guise of impeaclunent was certami. 
11ot .. rele,· all t ev i<lence lun·ing a tendency in rea.11 1'. 
t<i pru,·e or disprove any material facts in issut 
... \!though this appeal is not based on the ground tl1. 
the questions propounded were necessarily re,·ersii1, 
error. we do elaim that those questions without a11\ 
elem· instructions limiting the only purpose for wh)c 
that tcstimouy could be used might be enough to int.: 
guilt and l'onvict an innocent man. 
The need to limit the purpose for which impead 
mellt e,·idence is introduced was indicated in Stat. 
z·. Edr1.:rIJ"dR. 13 Ctah 2d 51, 368 P. 2d 464 (19621. l'. 
that case the defendant was convicted of profiting fM!. 
the earnings of a fallen woman. On cross-examinati1' 
the defendant was asked prejudicial questions concerr 
ing his pre,·iously being in jail and his tendency fr· 
getting drunk in public. On appeal this court reHN 
on the ground that the "defendant in a criminal ca~· 
may not be questioned as to matters wholly rem1r 
from the questions of guilt or innocent of the criru 
charged. so as to amount to a general assault upon 1'" 
36 
diarader". This court also expressly referred to the 
Jlt'('(l for limiting instructions, but since no instruction 
1, a.., rcqueskcl, the court refused to rule on that ground. 
llw court stated: 
"l 11 the instant case, the defendant having 
placed in issue his wife's character, the fact that 
..,he had pleaded guilty to the crime of prostitu-
tion tended to impeach the defendant's assertion 
that his wife was a woman of good character, 
and thus impeach his veracity. Therefore, the 
ct ucs tions propounded relating to the wife's plea 
nf guilty were proper for this limited purpose. 
An iwdructiun to the jur.IJ re.ytrictiny its cun-
sidcration uf thi.Y evidence tu this limited purpose 
ccrtainl.t1 7.1..;uuld have been in order. However, 
110 such instruction was requested by the de-
fendant." 
E ve11 so this court reversed. It is urged that this 
{'()lift compare the line of questioning in Edwards with 
the questioning here. It is almost identical. Although 
1t i~ not contended that the questioning was necessarily 
reYersible error, it is called to the court's attention to 
~how the greater need for limiting instructions. The 
que'itioning here like in Edwards is certainly collateral 
and remote to the issue of his guilt or innocence. 
This court in State 'L'. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 
:!iU P ~cl Hl4 (1955), again referred to the need for 
m-,truetions couched in plain and unambiguous lan-
g-uage. The court at p. 133 stated: 
" ... It is settled in this court that the state 
may not prove that the defendant committed 
other offenses merely to show his propensity for 
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the eommiss ion of erime, bee a use sueh eridu
1
,. 
is apt to he given undue weight. llowe,·1:r. q. 
e\·ide11t·e of other crimes is ~ulmissihle if it tt 11 ,;, 
to pro,·e that he had the necessary intention!.· 
the crime charged. For e\·idcnce admissible f. 
one purpose is not inadmissible beeause it fa.!. 
to meet the requirements for admissibilitr 111 • 
another purpose. but tlu: jur,1; should he in.~i,. 111 • 
l'd l/()f to uu it for the inadmissible JJlll'Jlli.11 
Thi.'< the 1·011rt did in this case and contran1 t 
dcfc11da11t's (//'rf ll lllC11t such instruction '1w1.~ i1t•r 
and 1111dcrstruulablc by the jury." 
Facts in the present case are similar to Kemp: 
Gui·cr1111101t of Canal Zone, 167 F. 2d 938 (5th Cir 
I U48 1. where the court did give limiting instructio11· 
ln the case the defendant was convicted of murdtr 
\\'ht>n defendant took the stand on cross-examinati1 1: 
he was asked if he had been previously convicted · 
two felonies in the State of \ Vashington and whethe: 
they were robbery and murder. The trial court i11stru1'1-
nl the jur.IJ that those convictions could not be tal.n 
a.'< C'l.'idcnce of yuilt or innocence upon the trial. ln1 
u:erc to he considered only as affecting defendant 
crcdibilit.tJ as a witness. On appeal the court held th1.' 
iw.;truction 'li..:as not in error. The court agreed that wk 
the defendant took the stand in his own defense he wa, 
subject to impeachment like any other witness, bu'. 
the court also felt that the defendant deserved thr 
proper limiting instructions. 
The l'ourt in J/ afters v. Cornmon"ll:ealth, 2-15 S.W 
::?ll ~na (Ky. 1 !);)::? ) • also recognized the need to explai· 
to the jury the proper use of such testimony. In th3· 
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l·a~t· the defe11da11t was charged with and convicted of 
t'<•Illlllitti11g armed robbery. The court on appeal re-
, t·r~ed aud stated that although the questions asked 
llit· defendant on cross-examination concerning his prior 
,·111:,·iction were admissible, it was the duty of the trial 
t'<iurt to admonish the jury as to the limited purpose for 
11 hid1 the nidence was admissible. 
The court in Parley r. State, 93 Okla. Cr. 192, 226 
Ii. :.!d I 00:.! (I HJ I ) , also recognized the need for limit-
:! 1).! i11slrnctio11s. In that case the defendant was cou-
1 ll'kd of grand larceny. The counsel for defendant on 
,iirl'd examination in interrogating his own witness 
l1rr1t11.d1t out the fact that he had been convicted of 
t liree prior felonies for which he has served time. On 
nnss-examination the county attorney, like in our case, 
\1t·11t into the nature of the crime for which the witness 
had been convicted and without objection by defense 
l'Otlllsel. The trial court gave the following complained-
of instruction: 
"In considering the testimony of a witness 
who the evidence shows has heretofore been con-
victed of an offense, you may consider such fact 
of convicton onl,ll as it may or may not in your 
judgment affect the weight or credibility you 
may give to the testimony of such witness." 
011 appeal the court agreed that such cross-examination 
was proper but added: 
"So, where, in the case of a witness for either 
the <lefendant or the state, evidence is admitted 
and limited to the purpose of affecting the credi-
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bility of such witness, showing prior co11vict. 
or e011victions for erime, the State ur the dc1~ · 
ant, w1 the case may /Jc /Jy the same pri1tli· 
i m.·olrcd 7.1.:h c 11 such n:id e 11 cc 7.L'as ad 111 i It nl 1. 
1 
•·' 
o dcft'lu/r111t, 7.1.:ould he entitled tu an instr 11 cr1 
l'.'I the trial juyc, limiti11y the purpuu fur ,t'i11 
:welt <Tidcncc 7.L'as admitted, a."S uthcn.l·isc .11 . 
n·idcncc miyht prejudice the defendant or :
1 
State as the case might be beyond the scopt; 
which the testimony was admitted. For ~u~ 
reason, we conelwle that the court did uot t·r 
in giving the instruction complained of." . 
These cases have indiea te<l that the principal pr1.r 
km in the w .. e of prior COI!Yidions to impeaeh i~ '.i 
risk of the improper use of the evidence by the j11r 
partil'ularly where the defendant is being impead1· 
111 his capacity as a witness. Empirical evidence by:: 
l · niversity of Chil'ago Jury project confirms the m,;. 
of what has been suspected: "jurors have an 'alm1· 
unin.Tsal inability an<l or unwillingness either to undt· 
stand or follow the court's instruction on the ust 1 
defendant's prior l'riminal record for impeachmei. 
purposes·.· See Xote 70 Yale L. J. 763, 777 ( 1961 
In another study. Hans Ziesel and Harry Kah-en, Jr. 
both l'niversity of Chicago law professors, haw ju· 
completed an exhaustiYe ten-year study of the behari1· 
of .iuries in felony trials throughout the countf) 
Kah-en -": Ziesel. The American Jury (1966). 'n· 
authors first selected a national cross section of :1P 
felony eases. all of which tried before juries ht 
tween I n.H and I H58. They then obtained detailed wr:: 
ten interYiews from the judges who presided at e3t: 
-W 
1( tllt'se trials. From each of the judges they ascertained 
, 1. the result the judge would have reached had the 
l a.,l. bcrn tried before him sitting without a jury, and 
·• if tkre was a difference in result, the judge's ex-
iilai1alio11 from the result reached by the jury. Then 
1r111n that the authors analyzed the material and drew 
: lie t"()!lcillsio11s they felt their analysis permitted. Those 
·t111l'iusiu11s which show the definite need for limiting 
'! ~t rndo11s as to the use of prior convictions for im-
I" al·h111('11t are as follows: 
l. The jury is far more likely to acquit a defend-
.lll: " lio has no record and takes the stand than will 
11w .iudge. 
~- 111 117 of the 3576 cases, the defense counsel 
duist· a jury and the defendant was either convicted 
• 
1 r the jury could not reach a verdict. In each of those 
J 17 eases, the judge, had he been sitting alone, would 
lian: acquitted. In thirteen percent of these cases, the 
u11farnrable verdict was attributable to some immoral 
,1r rnlgar behavior on the part of the defendant. The 
authors find that a number of these jury verdicts were 
,lt1t· to the jury's lack of sophistication in making credi-
bility evaluation. In their view, the judge is better able 
Io ft'llcc off the less credible components of the case, and 
ti) '>eparate the wheat from the chaff. The jury tends to 
f, illt"' the old maxim, f al us in uno, falus in omnibus. 
· \" ende11ce of the jury's lesser ability the authors point 
t 11 t l1t· fact that in ten percent of these 117 cases, the 
1kf 1 11da11t either failed to testify or had a record. See 
41 
also .J o~ma X. Ko1>l0Yit·z, J>oc1k J>c,·1·, (_' · > '- .._·w, r11n.? 
Law Bulletin, Xo. U (HHW). 
. . ~<'ro~n that ~tudy. one can see the need for p:·1111 
l11n1tmg mstruet1011s smce eYidenl'.e of prior co11, iL·t.. 
is properlv introduced not as eYide11l'.c of guilt IHll i 
impeachme11t purposes. It is also important ti 1 11 , 
that if the jury is gi,·e11 the proper cautionary in~tr. 
tion they do haYe the ability to understand and fi•i;, 
it. Kah-en and z;esel. in their study of 'Phc A 1111 ri . 
.Jury, stated as follows: 
"l. pon analysis, howe\·er, we read the l°h'.: 
as making an importa11t point about tlu.: i:.r. 
re,·olt from the law. It has been a h:1sic ·tLt· 
of this study that the jury by and large resp11,: 
to the discipline of the e\·idence, and whl'n 
does not, it L'onceals from itself its own resJ)(I'.. 
to sentiment, sentime11t under the guise of rl's111 
ing issues of eYidential doubt ... Table Ill 1• 
,·eals that the discipline of the eYidence and;· 
discipline of the judge's comments re-e11f11n 
each other with the result that, when both ::: 
present, they Yirtually eliminate disagrermer · 
The moral then is that the momentum of l!· 
jury's ren>lt is neyer enough to carry the .iu' 
beyond the e,·idence and the judge." Kalren" 
Ziesel. The American .T ury, p. 427 ( 19tHi 1. 
It is also important to note that where there i~ ~: 
indictment for a felony and also a second count rhar~ 
ing the alleged felon with being an habitual crimin~ 
Ftah by statute has adopted the policy of keepr'. 
former conYictions from the jury until the guilt or iw. 
cence of the accused, under the charge of the prN'. 
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,r:i 11 c. 1s dt:krmi11ed, lTtah Code Arm.~ 70-1-rn (1953). 
l'i 1, \ital ditl'erem·e between this method and the com-
iJ!"11 i:t\1 11wthod is that under this statute, former co11-
\ 'l'' 11111' :1n· kept from the jury until the guilt or inno-
•·. 11 -.· 1-, dder111i11ed, whereas at common law the con-
,d11111-. are allowed i11 with cautionary i11structio11s 
...''t'rt !1• tile jury. l~tah's statute was adopted after a 
, Iii l:tr l'll11rn·ctic11t statute. The reason for such pre-
' .,,111\lt 11a-. me11tio11ed in State i·. Jt'erro11e, !}() Corm, 
liitl. l 1:1 .\. -t-.'5:!, 457 (1H21 ). where the court stated: 
.. 1 t cannot be belie,·ed that an accused man 
would e\·er haYe a fair trial resulting in a verdict 
not affected by prejudice or by consideration 
by which the jury should not be infiuenced, if 
during that trial allegations that he has twice 
before been conyicted of state prison crimes have 
been read to the jury, and evidence of his former 
eonvictions has been placed before them." 
The effect of allowing the prosecutor to impeach the 
,!tfr11da11t here without limiting the application to 
11 li1cli prior convictions can be put by the jury operates 
ti· l·11111pletely abrogate the effectiveness of the above 
-.Litute .. An argument that the defendant had a choice 
1111! \I 1 take the stand is not persuasive since \' aldez 
i,;,d 111> real choice in the matter. He had to take the 
,(arid to defend himself and avoid any adverse infer-
' tit'1·~. Since l'tah has seen fit to legislate this policy 
pr. 1L1hit ing inferenees of guilt based on prior convic-
1 1 111-.. it -.hould then he enforced at least by limiting 
tih lhf ,if· t·Yidenee of prior convictions by advising the 
11JJ"\ of its restricted use. This court in State v. 
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Sullit·<rn. Ii i·tah ~d 110, :w7 P. ~d ~l~ {l!l.>i1. ar: 
lated this polil'y in a similar ma1mer: 
··The presumption of i1111on·11t and the l'llJ' . 
me11t of prollf of g111lt beyond any rca~1'11. 
douht, arc indeed of the utmost importa1iL·i 
:-.afrguards against the possibility of l'Oll\JL'. 
the i1111ol'l'nt. \\'e sn11pulously adhere t11 ;! 
11ot withstanding the dill'il'ulties e11l'ou11ltrtd . 
the po:-.sibility that so111t· guilty may esl'apl' 11 . 
ishment. It is a11 anl'ien t and honored ada,;, 
our law that it is hettn that ten gui1~1 • 
free than that one in11ol'e11t person be }H1111~ 
II' c a JJ prccia le I Ii c ,,:isd o 111 of th c 111rui111 
the i111porla11u· of ol'Cordiny C7.'tr// propa. 
,11idcratio11 lo those accusul uf crime." 
The l'ourt in ,')'umrall t'. l 'nitcd Statc8, 3tW F 
:311 (10th Cir. IHtiti), also rel'ognized the llel'e~~1'._, 
ha Ying exading instrul'tions. In that ease the dtt1; 
ants were l'OllYided after a jury trial of armnl : 
hery of a federally insured bank. The only point ra · 
on appeal was that the trial l'<Hirt l'ommitted enw 
refusing to strike an "unresponsi,·e, prejudil'ial :1: 
inflammatory" referenee by a polil'e offil'er-wit11t'' 
the past "reeords" of the defendants. The Tenth L · 
euit Court of Appeals. eom·eding that the eYidelll't 
guilt was m·erwhdming, neYertheless re\'ersed the L"" 
Yid ion. It held. citing numerous cases, that eYidr1, 
of prior eriminal eornlud was not admissible to e,t:: 
lish guilt. The eourt stated that whether a reYersal :l' 
new trial is required depends on "whether the .1c 
was more prone to en11Yid these appellants knowing- frt 
1 1 prt·\ 1< 1t1 ... records ... The court then made this tiiial 
. ~ ,t n at 1011. "Ii ich is certairdy appropriate here: 
"Tt:dmical niceties sud1 as these make the law 
:11'lwar ridiculous to the man in the street. But 
;til law is technical if viewed 011h· from eo11eer11 
f11r punishing crime without he~ding the mode 
11\· \\ hich it is accomplished' ... See J ustiee Frank-
f;1rtn i11 Bullc11/J('('k 1'. l'.S., a:w lT.s. ti07, tiU, 
titi S. Ct. +o~. UO L. Ed. :350. "In cireurnstances 
ld-.t· tlwse the question is not whether the appd-
la11b ha n· been proven guilty, hut whether guilt 
11a., IH'cll established aecording to the proeedural 
... a frgua nb to insure trial before a fair and u11-
prc_p1diced jury. It is not enough to be able to 
... ;1y that the e\·idence is entirely sufficient to 
l'(Jll\ ict without reference to prior records of ap-
pcll:rnts and that the jury would ha,·e in all 
Jirohabilities returned a verdict of guilty with-
' 'lit such knowledge. The question we must cle-
('idt· is whether the jury was more prone to con-
' id these appellants knowing they had pre,·ious 
rernrds than without such knowledge. In other 
w11rds. can we say without reasoriahle certainty 
that the reference to prior records 'had but ,·ery 
slight etket 011 the ,·erdict of the jury'?" 
( )11e need only read the transcript pertaining to 
'.l\f' cro...,s-examination of Yaldez to see the need for a 
·:1 1t11111ary instrudion. (See R. 7:3, 74, 80, 81). The 
:r 1al <'(1t1rt's refusal to give a limiting instruction in 
1!.!lit of tht" need for one, the defendant's request for 
'1:1t" :llld the <'ase law requiring one was definitely preju-
l1t·1:tl and n·versihle error. 
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COXCLL'SlOX 
Thl' 111sta11t action prl'sl'11ted facts to tlit .!·." 
whl'rl' thl' pmilio11 of the prosecutor and thl' d1 ". 
were sulista11tially at loggl'rheads. The curnµlai1. 
wit11l'ss was till' only i11di,·idual whose testi1uo11y , 
ported all the elements of the crime with ,,Ji1ti1 
appellant was charged. A large portion of the tllilt 
reeein·d at trial was directed towards the appdb; 
pn·\'ious criminal reeord and i11Yoln_.ment. 111 tlit 
sem·e of i11Strudio11s limiting the use of this te-.,!1111 
with the narrow limits which the law recog11iz(·-., , .· 
porti11g its i11trodudio11 the appellant was 0111 '" .· 
pn·judiecd. Further the failure of the trial c111, ... 
instrud 011 the lesser included offense which wa" r:i, 
hy the e\·idem·e is blatant prejwlieial error. It i." 11!11 
justice will he serYed only by returning this !';N · 
Ill'\\' trial under eireumstanees which will i11s11rt· :. 
any ('om· id ion will n·s1rlt therefrom would he tht rr·,1 
of proof of guilt of the crime eharged and not lllt!°' 
of h:l\·ing a had record in the past. 
This eourt should reYerse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOXALD X. BOYCE 
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